CONSTITUTIONALISM
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF LATIN AMERICA
Miguel Schor1
I. Introduction
The internal effects of a mutable policy are . . . calamitous. It poisons the
blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are
made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot
be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or
revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no
man who knows what the law is to-day can guess what it will be tomorrow.2
The United States and the nations of Latin America became independent in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Independence movements throughout the
Americas were motivated by similar ideological currents and, as a consequence,
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constitutions were framed throughout the Americas to cement the victory of liberalism.3
Although constitutions throughout the Americas were designed to institute republican
government, the United States clearly enjoyed a different political outcome than did the
nations of Latin America. This Article explores a deceptively simple question which is
why the founding of the constitution led to republican government in the United States
whereas the founding of constitutions led to oligarchy and dictatorship in Latin America
for much of that region’s history.
The answer to this question lies in the historical processes by which constitutions
become entrenched so that they gain the political support they need to withstand the
buffeting of politics. The issue of how constitutions become entrenched is of grave
contemporary relevance as Latin America is undergoing profound transformations that
were touched off by the crumbling of authoritarian regimes throughout the region in the
waning decades of the twentieth century.4 Although polities democratized, there are deep
concerns about the quality of democratic governance throughout the region.5 Presidents
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are elected but often act and look much like the dictators or caudillos of the nineteenth
century.6 Elections are thriving but power is not curtailed by constitutions. The
seriousness of the failure to entrench constitutional rules cannot be underestimated. The
legitimacy of a democracy rests on majority rule and on an agreed upon set of ground
rules that limit the power of elected leaders. If democracies fail to institutionalize the
fundamental rules of the game, support for democracy will erode.7
A commitment to the fundamental rules of the game in Latin America has clearly
not been institutionalized. Constitutional law in Latin America, which formally is
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intended to limit political power,8 behaves very differently than it does in the United
States because of the remarkable ease with which constitutional provisions can be
ignored or changed.9 Elections have become the route to power but they do not guarantee
stability as a number of elected presidents have been ousted from power before their
terms expired.10 Once in office, Presidents find that constitutions provide little in the way
of checks and balances. It took Ernesto Zedillo, the former president of Mexico, one
month to amend the constitution so as to fundamentally transform the manner in which
the Mexican Supreme Court exercised constitutional judicial review.11 President Hugo
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Chávez swore in his oath of office in 1998 that he would do away with Venezuela’s
existing constitution.12 He cemented his power by using a constitutional convention to
promulgate a new constitution in 1999.13 Former president Fujimori of Peru mounted a
popular coup against his own government by claiming, in part, that the judiciary was
corrupt and fired three justices who voted to uphold a constitutional prohibition against
running for a third term.14 Former president Menem of Argentina stacked the Supreme
Court with his cronies who stoutly defended Menem’s decree power to legislate as he
wished without obtaining Congressional approval.15 President Lucio Gutiérrez of
Ecuador was forced out of office because of widespread popular unrest caused, in part, by
his decision to sack a Supreme Court that sided with his political opponents.16 The ease
with which constitutions can be changed or ignored is facilitated by the widespread
mistrust of the judiciary that exists in Latin America.17
Latin America’s experience with constitutions illustrates that democracy comes in
more than one flavor. At one end of the spectrum are consolidated or liberal democracies
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that have both vertical and horizontal accountability.18 Consolidated democracies have
elections that provide vertical accountability and laws and constitutions that provide the
mechanisms used by a complex web of actors to ensure horizontal accountability.19
Elected leaders do not know ex ante what the outcome of any political dispute will be
because disputes are mediated by relatively fixed rules.20 At the other end of the
spectrum lie illiberal democracies where leaders are elected but constitutions fail to limit
power. Elected leaders know ex ante the outcome of a dispute because the rules can be
ignored or changed in the middle of a dispute.
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The issue that this Article explores is how “governments of laws and not of men”
might emerge in Latin America.21 Democracies are consolidated when they become the
“only game in town” and dictatorship becomes unthinkable.22 What is needed is an
attitudinal shift so that the citizens and elites become wedded to the rules of the political
game.23 The “decisive step” in democratic consolidation occurs when there is
“devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules.”24 For democracy to work,
citizens have to be willing to support the constitution against inroads by elected leaders.
The recent transitions to democracy that have occurred in Latin America,25 however,
demonstrate that citizen support for elections does not necessarily translate into support
for constitutional limits to power. Horizontal accountability does not emerge at the same
time as does vertical accountability. A constituency for a constitution is more difficult to
construct than is a constituency for electing leaders.
The process by which horizontal accountability emerges so that constitutions
become not only formally but also behaviorally entrenched against the shifting sands of
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politics is not well understood.26 Constitutional law in Latin America has an almost
surreal quality given that constitutions do not provide accurate maps to how power is
distributed.27 All legal orders have a gap between the law on the books and the law as
practiced28 but this gap is broader in Latin American than in the United States.29 In Karst
and Rosenn’s pioneering Law and Development in Latin America: a Case Book, the
authors suggest that the enormity of the gap is captured by the Spanish and Portuguese
maxim: “For our friends, everything; for strangers, nothing; and for enemies, the law!”30
The anthropologist Roberto Da Matta argues that hierarchical social relations provide a
more accurate map to power in Brazil than does the law.31 Rather than the rule of law,
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Latin America is said to suffer from the “(un)rule of law.”32 Given the magical nature of
the formal constitutional rules in Latin America, this Article will peer through the looking
glass of constitutionalism in Latin America to explore the process by which constitutions
become entrenched against political inroads by examining three, interrelated puzzles.
The first, which is discussed in Part II infra, concerns why the American
constitution limits political power. To understand why horizontal accountability has not
emerged in Latin America, we first need to understand why the American constitution
limits political power. There are two competing answers to this question. The
conventional account of constitutionalism posits that constitutions can become
entrenched only if they operate as a species of law.33 That is, only if constitutional law
rests on some form of “neutral principles” will it be respected by other actors.34 The
problem with the conventional account is that it confuses the end of a long historical
process with the process itself. The constitution is not legitimate because the Supreme
Court now enjoys the authority to issue orders that other political actors generally accept
but because the constitution gained broad societal acceptance in a contingent, historical
process.35
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The other principal account of American constitutionalism is a realist one.36 It
posits that the secret of the success of the American constitution lies not in a shared
understanding that constitutional law must be kept distinct from politics by having the
former rest on non-political, neutral principles, as the conventional account argues, but
rather in a shared understanding that constitutional politics is played under different rules
than ordinary politics. American constitutionalism rests on a broad societal
understanding that changing the constitution requires a greater degree of debate and
citizen mobilization than is required for changing ordinary statutes. By bringing we the
people back into the story of the constitution, the realist account rightly focuses attention
on how constitutions are socially constructed over time. The constitutional enterprise is,
as John Finn notes, an “effort to create a particular type of community, a constitutional
democracy, that can survive the corrupting influences of time and fortune.”37
The second puzzle, which is discussed in Part III infra, explores why polities with
similar constitutions sometimes enjoy very different governments. The newly
independent nations of Latin America adopted constitutions that formally looked like that
of the United States yet the result was oligarchy and dictatorship, not democracy. The
scholarly consensus is that constitutions operated differently in Latin America than in the
United States because they were planted on a social soil that was inimical to
democracy.38 Laws are not, however, merely a reflection of the larger social, economic,
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political, and cultural environment in which they are embedded.39 The gap between
written constitutions and political reality in the region is not simply a result of the
differing conditions that existed between Latin American and the United States at the
time of independence40 but is also a result of how constitutions were socially
constructed.41 The elites or framers who shaped Latin America’s constitutions believed
that economic development had to occur before the masses could be allowed to
participate in democracy. As a consequence, these elites opted for malleable
constitutions. This enhanced elite power as rulers knew in advance the results of any
political outcome but at the expense of the attitudinal shift needed for democracy to be
consolidated as there was little reason for citizens to become wedded to rules that could
be readily changed at the behest of their rulers. Constitutions are not entrenched in Latin
America because political leaders do not fear citizen mobilization when the fundamental
rules of the game are violated.
The third puzzle, which is discussed in Part IV infra, is why it has proven so
difficult to entrench constitutions in Latin America. The formal rules of the game had to
be malleable if elites were to retain power but the consequences are, as Madison
surmised, “calamitous.”42 Every change in political leadership is a potential
constitutional crisis if the selection of new leaders means that the fundamental rules of
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the game might be changed with the adoption of a new constitution.43 The sheer number
of constitutions adopted in Latin America stands mute testimony to the regularity of
irregular accession to power by presidents and dictators. The logic of this constitutional
cycle can only be broken if power is devolved from elites to rules. This in turn can occur
only if constitutional politics become separated from ordinary politics. Societies gain the
understanding that constitutions should be difficult to change when broad social
movements arise that seek to effectuate rights.44 The experience of the United States
teaches us that rights become entrenched when they gain a constituency. The experience
of Latin America, on the other hand, teaches us that without deep social moorings,
constitutions can neither limit power nor withstand the test of time.
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II. Constitutionalism in the United States
There is almost no political question in the United States that is not resolved
sooner or later into a judicial question. Hence the obligation under which the
parties find themselves in their daily polemics to borrow from the ideas and
language of justice. . . . Judicial language thus becomes in a way the vulgar
language; the spirit of the lawyers, born inside the schools and the courts,
therefore spreads little by little beyond their precincts; it so to speak infiltrates all
society, it descends into the lowest ranks, and the people as a whole in the end
contract a part of the habits and the tastes of the magistrates.45
The rise of democracy throughout the world had a profound impact on legal
scholarship as comparative constitutionalism has become an important area of research.46
Perhaps more importantly it may help move constitutional theory away from a somewhat
parochial focus on the normative limits of judicial review to more fertile issues such as
exploring the role that constitutions play in maintaining democracy.47 Throughout the
world, new democracies have sought to strengthen national high courts in a bid to
entrench constitutions48 but it is not clear whether or how those constitutions will garner
the political support they need to limit power successfully. De Tocqueville’s observation
concerning the attitudinal shift by the citizenry that was a necessary prerequisite for
successful constitutionalism in the United States has become a pressing research issue
given that it has proven easier to elect leaders than to make constitutions work.
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The United States has had a successful democracy for over two centuries,
moreover, so it makes sense to search for an answer to this question in the American
experience. American constitutionalism is, as Professor Griffin argues, a “distinctive
political practice that deserves closer study than it has so far received.”49 There are two
competing accounts of what makes the American constitution work.50 One account
posits that constitutions have the legitimacy they need to cabin political power only if
they operate as a species of law and that constitutionalism, therefore, rests on a shared
understanding that politics is distinct from law. This view comports with our
conventional understanding of the role of the constitution in American democracy and is
discussed in Part II(A) infra. The weakness of the conventional account is that it assumes
that courts are able to play the key role in maintaining constitutional limits on political
power because citizens believe that the constitution should be treated as law. The notion
of American exceptionalism51—that the constitution works because the United States is a
liberal society with shared values—is deeply ingrained but it does not provide an accurate
picture of the political practices that sustain American constitutionalism. The reality of
American politics is that citizens do not act as if constitutional maintenance should be the
sole domain of courts52 and are very much engaged in constitutional discourse.53 The rise
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of democracy through the world, moreover, casts doubt on any claim that American
constitutional democracy is exceptional. The realist account of constitutionalism, which
is discussed in Part II(B) infra, provides a very different and better analysis of the
political practices that underpin American constitutionalism because it moves courts
away from the center of the constitutional universe by bringing we the people back into
the story of American constitutionalism. It also does a better job of explaining how
different polities and cultures may enjoy constitutional democracy because the focus is on
the political practices that sustain constitutionalism rather than the law of the
Constitution. While the institutions of American government are not readily transported
across cultural boundaries as the constitutional experience of Latin America
demonstrates,54 the mechanisms by which citizens become wedded to constitutions are
universal.
A. The conventional account of constitutionalism
The conventional account of constitutionalism rests on two heroic assumptions:
(1) the successful founding of the constitution was due to the propitious circumstances of
American history and (2) the constitution was the legal engine that maintained American
democracy over time. The former rests on a triumphalist view of American history
which is that the United States enjoyed an equality of social conditions that made
possible a democratic revolution that led to the promulgation of the constitution. The
latter posits that key to the success of American democracy in enduring for over two
53
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centuries is the legitimacy of the constitution which in turn rests on maintaining a wall
between law and politics. The key actor in this republican drama is the judiciary.
Constitutions safeguard democracy by creating a system of checks and balances that are
maintained over time by courts. Courts play the key role in maintaining constitutions
whereas the task of transforming constitutions via amendments is political in nature.
Amendments are the tool used to change these foundational documents to accommodate
their strictures to evolving social, political, and economic conditions. The conventional
account, in short, emphasizes a sharp break between law and politics and provides courts,
principally the Supreme Court, with the principal role in maintaining the vigor of the
constitution over time.
Richard S. Kay in American Constitutionalism55 provides a fine exposition of the
conventional understanding of constitutionalism. He defines constitutionalism as the
“’trust . . . men repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment to keep
government in order.’”56 This trust flows from a particularly American innovation when
it came to constitutionalism which was to fix the fundamental rules used to limit the
power of government by putting those rules in writing.57 That is to say, constitutions are
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able maintain order because they are promulgated based on a “widely shared political
consensus as to the nature of the constituent authority in a polity,”58 and are interpreted in
accordance with written rules. The key to keeping these rules fixed is to create an
agency, namely the Supreme Court, which lacks political motivation and will interpret
these rules, therefore, according to the “original intent of the constitutional enactors.”59
In short, the success of American democracy in enduring for two centuries rests on the
legitimacy of the constitution which, in turn, can only be maintained by a Supreme Court
that observes interpretational niceties.60
Although the conventional account of constitutionalism emphasizes the role of the
Supreme Court in explaining the success of American constitutionalism to the exclusion
of almost all other factors, the conventional account also provides us with an idea of the
sort of soil on which constitutions must be planted if they are to be successfully
implemented. What is required is a society that is relatively egalitarian and enjoys a fair
amount of ideological consensus.61 Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America,62 for
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example, argues that the remarkable success of the Constitution and the subsequent
power of the Supreme Court rest on the fact that the United States lacks a feudal past.63
As a result, the American revolution was far gentler than in other parts of the world such
as Europe or Latin America that experienced feudalism.64 The revolutionary wave that
swept the North Atlantic world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
sought to usher in profound transformations. The difficulties that these transformations
entailed cannot be underestimated as they required deep and profound political,
economic, and social changes. The goals of these transformations were to replace
monarchy with republican government , mercantilism with capitalism, and an
inegalitarian, hierarchical social structure with egalitarianism. Hartz argues that
American revolution was successful because the colonies did not need to undergo these
transformations. The United States was exceptional because liberalism lacked any
challengers. The constitution worked because there were no fundamental struggles over
values in the United States:
For the solution that the constitutionalists offered to the frightful conflicts they
imagined was a complicated scheme of checks and balances which it is reasonable
to argue only a highly united nation could make work at all. Delay and deliberate
confusion in government became intolerable in communities were men have
decisive social programs that they want to execute.”65
In short, American revolutionaries inherited a liberal society which explains the success
of the constitution.
62
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The importance given the Supreme Court in maintaining the constitution by the
conventional account of constitutionalism leads to a concrete set of policy prescriptions
for the newly democratized nations of the world. If they wish to enjoy constitutional
success, these nations must adopt the “best practices” of consolidated democracies, such
as the United States. 66 These new democracies must seek to implement written
constitutions by establishing and strengthening supreme or constitutional courts. The key
to implementing constitutions is to have supreme courts with the independence to enforce
constitutional guarantees without regard to political pressure to the contrary.67 The
power of the conventional account in our understanding of constitutionalism is illustrated
by the extensive literature on judicial independence that has been written in the wake of
the third wave of democratization.68
When it comes to providing advice for the new democracies of the world, the
conventional account suffers from a latent but profound contradiction. These nations
should adopt written constitutions and strengthen independent supreme courts yet these
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institutions cannot work well when transplanted to societies that look markedly different
than the United States.69 The conventional account of constitutionalism rests on the
notion of American exceptionalism, which, if correct, presents a fairly dim future for the
new democracies of the world. Formal legal structures such as written constitutions and
supreme courts that enjoy nominal independence are easy to transplant but what gives
constitutional law its efficacy is a legal and political culture that cannot be transplanted.
De Tocqueville’s observation that in the United States political issues eventually become
judicial questions presupposes, of course, that citizens are willing to accept the rule of
law. Hartz makes this point when he concludes that the United States has little to offer
the world when it comes to lessons about democracy by saying “Can a people born equal
ever understand others, can it ever understand itself.”70 The problem with the
conventional account is that it does not tell us how constitutions may be implemented in
other nations other than to wait for the mysterious process by which a people become
acculturated to the rule of law.
B. The realist account of constitutionalism
The third wave of democratization not only remade the political map of the world,
but it also led to very different questions being asked about our own constitution. The
conventional account of constitutionalism is moored in a world where American
exceptionalism is taken for granted. As a result, it conflates constitutional law with
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constitutionalism and focuses on how the constitution should be interpreted rather than
the role it plays in building a nation.71 A realist account, on the other hand, seeks to
provide an account of the American constitution that makes sense in a world which is
populated with a number of nations that are seeking to build constitutional democracies.
The starting point of any such a theory is Karl Llewellyn’s observation that a constitution
is not just a set of rules but a “somewhat peculiar” institution, because “it involves . . .
[the ways of living and doing] of a huge number of people—well-nigh the whole
population.”72 A core argument of this Article is that any adequate theory of
constitutionalism should turn not on normative theories of how the constitution should be
interpreted but rather the pragmatic and empirical question73 of what are the social
practices that enable constitutions to limit political power.
Although how constitutions become entrenched is clearly the central question for
constitutionalism in Latin America and in the developing world, the animating issue for
realist accounts of American constitutionalism has been a somewhat different question
which is what are the political or democratic practices that sustain the founding,
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transformation, and maintenance of constitutions.74 Bruce Ackerman’s We the People75
is a seminal, realist account of constitutionalism that breaks with the conventional
account of constitutionalism in two respects. First, he provides an empirically grounded
account of how the American constitution was founded and transformed. He argues that
the conventional account of constitutionalism that distinguishes the revolutionary
underpinnings of the constitution from the legal transformations that it underwent
subsequent to the founding does not comport with our historical experience.
Constitutions are made and changed as a result of “constitutional politics”76 or political
movements. Second, he turns the focus from the role of the Supreme Court in
maintaining the constitution to the societal understandings that undergird the constitution.
What made the American constitution possible is not that the citizens believed that law
was distinct from politics with the former resting on neutral, apolitical principles and the
latter resting on the aggregation of votes but that they understood thatconstitutional
politics was to be played according to a different set of rules than ordinary politics. A
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higher degree of mobilization and consensus is required to make and change constitutions
than ordinary law.
Ackerman’s conclusion as to the importance of constitutional politics rests on
important commonalities between three key constitutional moments: thefounding of the
constitution, the civil war amendments, and the Supreme Court’s rejection of a role in
meaningfully reviewing economic legislation in the wake of the New Deal. The
conventional view is that the first is the result of the revolution, the second the result of
the amendment process, and the last is part of the normal pull and tug of interpretation as
the Court adopted an earlier and correct view of the scope of Congressional authority to
regulate the economy. Ackerman argues that these are not different events but related
because they are examples of constitutional politics which is the sine qua non of
successful constitutional change:
Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name of the People, a
movement’s political partisans must first, convince an extraordinary number of
their fellow citizens to take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they
do not normally accord to politics; second, they must allow their opponents a fair
opportunity to organize their own forces; third, they must convince a majority of
their fellow Americans to support their initiative as its merits are discussed, time
and again, in the deliberative fora provided for in ‘higher lawmaking.’77
Successful constitutional foundings and transformations, in short, rest on a bed of
democratic politics.
The realist account rests on a very different understanding of the democratic
beliefs and practices that sustain American constitutionalism than does the conventional
account. Constitutionalism does not require an exceptional culture that lacks serious
disagreement as Louis Hartz argued but rather a shared belief thatindividuals can
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disagree profoundly while agreeing that their disputes will be settled by a set of ground
rules that can be changed over time. American democracy manages to combine deep
ideological divisions with a shared commitment to a set of constitutional ground rules.78
It is easier, after all to agree on procedures to settle disputes than it is to agree on values.
The most important procedure that has been agreed upon is that the constitution should be
difficult to change. Constitutional changes do not always occur by formal amendment
but do involve a high level of social mobilization.79 Constitutional politics differs from
ordinary politics because of the degree of mobilization that is required for change to be
effectuated. In short, the support the constitution enjoys is evidenced by the political
mechanisms through which the United States Constitution has changed over time.
Moving courts away from the center of the constitutional universe has important
implications for developing nations. The conventional account paints a bleak picture for
whether constitutions can limit power in developing nations because it assumes that
democracies evolve over a very long time span and that without shared values,
constitutions are unlikely to work. The realist account, on the other hand, suggests that
constitutionalism may work in a number of different settings, even in nations with deep
ideological divisions and without a long tradition of democratic governance, as long as
citizens become attached to institutions. The American constitution became entrenched
not because it is a clever engineering feat or because courts maintain the boundary
between law and politics but because vibrant political practices sustain and nourish the
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formal provisions of the constitution.80 The key to making democracy work, therefore,
lies in nurturing the political practices by which institutions gain social support.81
The experience of Latin America teaches us, however, that simply adopting a
constitution—no matter how well crafted—does not ensure that the political practices
needed for constitutions to limit political power will emerge. American constitutionalism
rests on the shared understanding that constitutional change requires a high degree of
consensus. Latin American constitutionalism, on the other hand, rests on a very different
understanding which is that constitutions should be malleable and as readily changed as
ordinary legislation. Latin America provides a mirror through which we can see a
parallel constitutional universe that has important similarities and differences to our own.
Once institutions are invented, they can be copied by other polities but they are
transformed in the process.82 Part III traces the path of constitutionalism in Latin
America to examine the consequences of fusing constitutional politics with ordinary
politics that occurs when constitutions are not entrenched.
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III. The Path of Constitutionalism
in Latin America
There is nothing more difficult to carry through than initiating changes in a state’s
constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the
old order and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would
prosper under the new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their
adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because men are
generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested
them by experience.83
Machiavelli’s insight into the political difficulties facing the founding of new
constitutions suggests that Latin America’s experience following independence is the
norm whereas the United States’ experience is the exception.84 Independence in Latin
America was followed by unrelieved civil war for almost half a century throughout most
of the continent85 whereas the United States enjoyed a series of peaceful presidential
transitions throughout its history and did not face a civil war until the middle of the
nineteenth century. From the early days of the Republic, the constitution was an
important locus of power as the Supreme Court of the United States creatively used the
power of judicial review to enhance national power.86 There was political conflict but
there was also a shared understanding that those conflicts would play out under the rules
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provided by the constitution.87 In Latin America, on the other hand, constitutions were
not the source of power. Rather caudillos or strong leaders with a basis of popular
support provided the glue that held the newly independent nations of the region
together.88 In short, law mattered in determining political outcomes in the United States
in a manner that was not the case in Latin America.
Constitutions as well as the laws more generally took a different path in Latin
America than they did in the United States. The different path that the law took in Latin
America provides us with a window that can be used to explore the puzzling relationship
between law and the larger political, social, economic, and cultural structures in which
law operates. The framers of Latin America’s constitutions and drafters of her civil
codes borrowed from the United States and Europe.89 Scholars are divided on why the
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constitutions that were adopted in the wake of independence failed to regulate political
life in any meaningful sense. One view among scholars is that Latin America’s
constitutions did not work well because they were borrowed and failed to fit the social,
political, economic, and cultural realities of the region.90 According to this view, the
constitutions of the region were adopted with the intent of instituting liberalism but failed
to do so because of the marked social inequality in the region, the control that the
colonial state exercised over the economy, and the lack of experience with selfgovernment. The opposing view is that constitutions were not adopted to institute
liberalism but were simply facades for dictatorship.91 That is, independence was simply a
power grab by local elites who sought to maintain the old order by using liberal
constitutions to mask their true intentions. Both views are united, however, in the belief
that the explanation for the course of constitutionalism in Latin America lies not in
human agency or constitutional design but rather in how the environment of the region
modified or trumped the constitutions and laws that were adopted. This scholarly debate,
which is discussed in Part III(A) infra, rests on the assumption that law is shaped by its
environment and consequently laws that are foreign to a particular environment will fail
to take root and flourish.
There is little doubt that the environment in Latin America was not as conducive
to liberalism as the environment in the United States. Liberal constitutions in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were revolutionary. These constitutions marked a
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turning point from the ancient regime of monarchical governments, hierarchical societies,
and mercantilist economies to a new world of republican governments, egalitarian
societies, and free markets. Spain was more successful than England in transplanting the
foundations of the ancient regime to the New World.92 Spain yoked the conquistador and
the friar to build a socio-legal environment where status was the key to power.93 As a
consequence, a “neomedieval civilization” consisting of the “minorities of the State,
Church, and landed entrepreneurs, aided and abetted by a small but influential group of
merchants and entrepreneurs chiefly engaged in the extractive industries, collaborated to
preserve a fixed and constant order in a world of accelerating change.”94 In short, the
inability of liberal constitutions to transform Latin American provides a strong argument
for the importance of environmental factors in determining whether borrowed laws
succeed or fail.
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude, as does the scholarly debate concerning
why constitutions failed to implement republican government discussed in Part III(A)
infra, that the environment is the sole factor we must take into account in explaining
Latin American constitutionalism and that constitutional politicsplayed no role in
shaping the region’s political culture. Spain’s success in fashioning a New World in its
image cannot explain the remarkable persistence of an environment that is inimical to
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liberalism.95 Monarchy has been replaced by elected presidents who act more like
elected despots than leaders bound by constitutions.96 Free markets have proven difficult
to implement.97 Social and economic inequality remains pervasive.98 An environment
does not endure for over two centuries without being watered by human agency. In short,
the constitutional politics of Latin America, which is discussed in Part III(B) infra, has
played as important a role in shaping the environment of the region as has Spain’s legacy.
The framers of Latin America’s constitutions and law understood that
environmental factors were not conducive to the implementation of liberal constitutions.
Simon Bolívar, for example, argued in his Discourse at the Congress of Angostura that
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laws should be suited to the people for whom they are made; that it would be a
major coincidence if those of one nation could be adapted to another; that laws
must take into account the physical conditions of the country, climate, character
of the land, location, size, and mode of living of the people; that they should be in
keeping with the degree of liberty that the Constitution can sanction respecting the
religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, resources, numbers, commerce,
habits, and customs. This is the code we must consult, not the code of
Washington!99
Part III(B) discusses how a desire among the elites to develop and transform the region
which they believed to be backward100 led to the adoption of constitutions and laws that
provided significant power to the central state.101 The cure for underdevelopment was
oligarchy and dictatorship today, a more inclusive republican government tomorrow.
Law in Latin America did not take a failed path, 102 but, as this Article argues, a different
path which comported not only with the legacy of Spain but also the manner in which
constitutions and the laws more generally were constructed in the region.
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A. The scholarly debate
Until the third wave of democracy, Latin America provided a paradox:
constitutions throughout the region guaranteed democracy103 yet dictatorship or oligarchy
was the political reality. One possible answer to this paradox is to concede that although
liberal ideals have not been fully implemented, they remain a “permanent aspiration.”104
The issue then becomes why liberal aspirations failed to become political reality.
Professor Keith Rosenn seeks to answer this question in The Success of
Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin America: an
Explanation.105 He provides a fine summary of the principal factors that might explain
why Latin America experienced oligarchy and dictatorship whereas the United States
enjoyed democracy. He argues that three factors principally explain these differences.
First, the colonists in the United States had considerable experience with self-government
whereas the colonists in Latin America lackedsuch experience. Spain gave little power
of self-government to its colonies and chose to staff its bureaucracy with Spanish born
officials rather than those with roots in the colonies. Second, the United States
constitution was an “original creation, specially tailored to fit the fundamental values of
American society,”106 whereas Latin America’s constitutions “reflect inherent tensions
between fundamentally conflicting traditions that continue to exist in Latin American
society” between an “imported” liberal tradition and the native authoritarian and
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corporatist Hispanic tradition.107 This problem was compounded by a very different legal
tradition. Common law judges, unlike civil law ones, had the freedom and independence
to creatively construe the United States constitution.108 Thirdly, the United States
experienced a social revolution that led to equality following independence whereas Latin
America did not. The creole elite engineered independence to gain power not to
restructure society and the “wealth, power, and privileges of the aristocracy have
persisted since independence.”109 In short, constitutions in Latin America sought to
effectuate republican government but failed to do so because they were planted in an
environment that was inimical to liberalism.
Another possible answer to this paradox is to conclude that Latin America failed
to implement liberalism because that was not the goal of independence.110 The
constitutions of the region were not a failed attempt to establish republican government
but a successful attempt to preserve Hispanic absolutism using liberal forms.111 There
was little experience with or faith in using institutions to check power which is why
“power was . . . vested in one body.”112 Rather than the liberal tradition argues the
historian Claudio Véliz, Latin America is the heir of the centralist tradition.113 The
political regimes of the region, whether on the left or right, are bureaucratic and highly
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centralized.114 The revolutionary wave that swept the North Atlantic world in the late
eighteenth century failed to change this tradition. As a consequence of this deep-rooted
political tradition, Latin America has achieved “electoral democracy but not . . . liberal
democracy.”115
The problem with the scholarly analysis of why Latin America failed to achieve
republican government is that it focuses on the environment in which constitutions were
planted while de-emphasizing the role of human agency in constructing that environment.
There is little doubt that the distance between the ideals imbued in these foundational
documents and the political, social, and economic reality of the region helps explain why
the transplant of republican government did not thrive in the region. Yet it is a mistake to
ignore the role played by the liberal constitutions and laws that were adopted in the wake
of independence.116 Law played an important role in shaping the political culture of the
region in two important respects. First, the framers of the region’s constitutions
understood the social problems of the region and were clearly worried about the
possibility of civil unrest. To deal with this problem, they designed constitutions that
placed too much power in one central figure, namely the president.117 The idea was to
centralize power to facilitate economic development so that liberalism could be
effectuated later when development had transformed the conditions of the region. One
consequence of this degree of centralization was that laws became mutable which
facilitated elite control but meant that no one could trust having someone else run the
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government. Excessive presidential power led to greater not less unrest, however, as the
transition from a government of men to one of laws became impossible. Second, the
linkages between constitutions and the people which are necessary if constitutions are to
effectively cabin political power could not be created in such an environment. The
people had little trust in constitutions that could be changed so readily. Without popular
support, constitutions could not provide the institutional matrix needed for political
accommodations to be reached. To understand these consequences, however, we need to
understand the historical process by which the legal culture of the region was fashioned.
B. The historical path of the law in Latin America
The excessive concentration of political power that led to law being subordinated
to politics did not begin, however, after the conquest of Spanish America by the
Hapsburg monarchs in the sixteenth century as the scholarly debate concerning the failure
of constitutions in the region to institute liberalism assumes118 but during the 1750s when
power was centralized by the Bourbon monarchs who succeeded the Hapsburgs to the
Spanish throne in an attempt to facilitate economic development. When the Spaniards
under the Hapsburg monarchs erected the colonial state on the ruins of indigenous
civilizations, they created a remarkably flexible and stable political system in which law
was an important part of the glue that held the largest empire that the world had ever seen
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together.119 The legitimacy of the system can be measured by the simple fact that no
army was required to hold the Hapsburg empire together.120
The Hapsburgs governed through the Council of the Indies which employed a
procedure that though cumbersome ensured that all interested parties had a chance to
participate and that decisions were made strategically, “with an eye toward the
anticipated reaction.”121 Strategic behavior was facilitated at the local level by the
principle that officials could selectively ignore royal edicts that would cause too much
damage to local interests and by having the jurisdiction of those officials overlap so that
ambition could check ambition.122 Spanish colonial administration was a “government of
judges, where nearly every appointed official exercised some sort of judicial authority. . .
. The legal system served as a constant venue of negotiation between distinct groups and
individuals who comprised this hierarchical society.”123
The accommodations facilitated by the formal elements of Hapsburg governance
rested on an informal alliance, based on ties of kinship and interest, between local elites
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and royal bureaucrats. These ties made it difficult for the Crown to pursue policies that
conflicted with the oligarchy’s wishes. When the Bourbons came to power in 1713, they
inherited a “system that might best be described as self-rule at the king’s command.”124
The complex series of compromises on which the legitimacy of Hapsburg rule rested
were viewed by the Bourbons as corrupt and as preventing the reforms needed to quicken
economic growth both in Spain and the colonies. The intelligently inefficient, redundant,
and legalistic Hapsburg system was overhauled by the introduction of intendants whose
jurisdiction was clearly demarcated so that jurisdictional conflict did not impede royal
desires. Revenue collection was enhanced by appointing a salaried fiscal bureaucracy
and a military was built up to fend off foreign incursions. The Bourbon reforms resulted
in an “administrative revolution” which “created a new absolutist state, based . . . on a
standing army and a professional bureaucracy.”125 The pronounced centralism that
characterized the Latin American state until the 1980s began, therefore, with the Bourbon
reforms.
Colonial governance was toppled by the revolutionary wave that swept through
the Atlantic world at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth
centuries.126 Monarchies were replaced by republics while a legal system based on status
in which rights were determined by one’s place in society gave way to a legal system in
which citizens enjoyed equal rights and contract, not status, organized society. Law, not
status, would henceforth determine rights.
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Latin America, however, did not fully participate in this revolutionary wave.
Spanish America adopted constitutions and civil codes but these new institutions did not
transform society. Law regulated neither public nor private behavior because formal
rights were trumped by social norms. Monarchy was replaced by republican government
but contract did not replace status and it was status that determined where power lay.
The legal foundations of the post-independence state were subordinated to the social
bonds between powerful families which were the real basis of power.127 Latin America
remained a clientelistic, patrimonial society in which status determined which rights one
enjoyed.
The reason that independence did not result in revolutionary transformations lies
in the ambivalence that Creole elites had towards liberalism. They looked favorably on
being able to control their own economic destiny but had deep-rooted fears of
empowering the masses. It is no accident that those nations where the lower classes
posed the greatest threat to the upper class, such as Peru and Mexico, were the last to
achieve independence whereas independence on the periphery of the Spanish empire,
where the indigenous population was smaller, was achieved with less effort.128 Latin
American independence did not come about so much as the result of the revolutionary
wave that swept the North Atlantic world but as a result of the power vacuum created by
the forced abdication of the Spanish monarchy and the unhappiness of the Creole elites
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with the Bourbon reforms.129 The masses were mobilized to fight for independence, but
Latin American elites, unlike their counterparts in the United States, crafted institutions
that precluded citizen rights from being realized.
The twin legal pillars of the nineteenth century—liberal constitutions and civil
codes—masked how power was exercised. Suffrage was generally limited to free men
with property and the military, which had grown in size during the wars of independence,
was used to protect against internal unrest. Elections were rigged and strong leaders,
whose power rested on personal bonds with their followers, were the true source of
power. As Halperín-Donghi observes, “Among the many ways of overthrowing the
government practiced in post-revolutionary Spanish America, defeat at the polls was
conspicuously absent.”130 Stability, when it was achieved, did not rest on impersonal
constitutions, but on pacts which bound the real actors that exercised power in a polity.131
Caudillos, not constitutions, provided order by relying on personal loyalty, rather than
law, to glue society together.132
The quickening of economic growth in the late nineteenth century strengthened
the power of this small elite as it manipulated legal institutions to retain the benefits of
growth.133 Throughout Latin America, land tenure laws were changed to weaken
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corporate, that is Indian and religious, ownership of land and labor laws, such as debt
peonage and vagrancy laws, were used to force those who had been dispossessed of their
land to work on large commercial estates.134 Power was centralized in the hands of the
few and the legal system, therefore, was not afforded the power to accommodate disputes
between different interest groups. As a result, the legal system was marginalized from
the process of nation building.135
The economic growth that occurred under liberal regimes in late nineteenth
century Latin America led to their demise as new social groups, such as a middle class
and industrial workers, emerged and sought political representation. 136 Liberal regimes
were replaced by corporatist regimes in the twentieth century which sought to provide
some representation to these new social groups while controlling the demands they could
articulate. Government grew in size and complexity as more services were provided to
newly mobilized social groups but these services were selectively applied to enhance
centralized control.137 Constitutions, beginning with Mexico’s in 1917, were also
transformed since individual rights, which had formally been paramount in the liberal
constitutions of the nineteenth century, were subordinated to social rights. Social
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guarantees increased in quantity and complexity which added to the length of the typical
Latin American constitution.138
The tendency towards greater executive authority was a global one in the wake of
the depression: the “power of presidents, prime ministers, and dictators expanded as
central governments became managers of vast bureaucratic organizations aimed at
providing welfare and promoting economic development.”139 The oligarchic state was
replaced by a “modernizing” state which increasingly turned to bureaucratic control of
virtually all aspects of the economy as a means of achieving development. The state
sought to promote industrialization by selecting imports on which to raise tariffs, by
manipulating exchange rates to selectively aid local industry, by providing capital for
certain industries, and by manipulating labor.
Although the intent of these policies, known as import-substitution
industrialization, was to promote development, the unintended but principal consequence
was to deepen the entanglement of states and elites.140 The adoption of importsubstitution industrialization deepened the intertwining of state and elites by increasing
the range of activities over which the state could extend privileges to those with
connections.141 Politics became a zero sum game in which elites competed to obtain
privileges from the state. The result was a society in which businesses competed in the
political arena for favors rather than competed in the market. Laws flowed out of the
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state at a prodigious rate as elites competed for privileges.142 In short, the rise of the
corporatist state in the twentieth century, which was a logical response to demands for
economic development, strengthened elite power.
Since the bureaucracy was the locus of power which settled economic disputes,
there was no need for an impartial judiciary to settle disputes between private litigants.143
Instead the judiciary became a rich source of patronage for the executive.144 Those who
were unable to compete for bureaucratic privileges, the poor, were forced into the
informal or “black” sector of the economy. The rural poor sought a better life by
migrating in large numbers to the cities in the twentieth century throughout Latin
America.145 They found a legal system hostile to their interests and, as a result, were
forced to build homes on land they did not own and engage in a variety of trades for
which they lacked proper legal authorization.146
The shantytowns that rim Latin America’s cities and the chaotic nature of much
of the traffic and trade in her cities are a direct consequence of this failure of law. The
poor choose to invest less in their homes and businesses than they would have if the law
protected their property.147 Without a means of protecting contractual rights, the poor
choose to buy from those they know rather than engage in arms length transactions. They
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are also unable to grow their businesses since more complex forms of business
enterprises, such as partnership and corporation, require access to a legal system.
Without a system of tort law, accident rates increase since there is no legally imposed
financial incentive to use care when engaged in business or daily activities.
The collapse of the overly centralized Latin American state in the 1980s was
caused by its inability to provide the sorts of public goods that citizens demand of
government. This failure is intimately connected to the deficient Latin American
institutional environment which failed to facilitate the sort of cooperative behavior
needed to make government work. As a consequence of the failure of the developmental
state, the policy prescriptions that have been advocated to implement development
changed dramatically in the 1980s. Latin America has moved from the model of a strong
government that uses the law to command that certain changes be made to promote
development to a model in which leaders are elected, power is decentralized, and law
facilitates the sort of activities—economic, social, and political—needed to promote
development.
One of the important lessons to be learned from the role of law in Latin America
is that closed political systems can be buttressed by relatively “open” legal structures that
facilitate the accommodation of various interests whereas ostensibly pluralistic political
systems can be undermined by elitist legal structures. The colonial state was able to
endure without relying on a military because law under the Hapsburgs allowed
individuals to reach accommodations. The various authoritarian regimes that populated
independent Latin America, on the other hand, failed to provide legal systems that
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accommodated different interests.148 None of the institutions of these authoritarian
regimes worked as one might expect. Militaries were designed to maintain internal order
rather than provide defense from external enemies, constitutions legitimated
dictatorship,149 and the judiciary was designed to maintain control over marginalized
sectors of the populace rather than settle disputes.
Today’s current batch of democracies, therefore, “enjoy” an authoritarian legality
that is a legacy of policies designed to achieve development that began with the Bourbons
and continued up through the 1980s.150 Democratic consolidation requires a transition
from this deep-rooted authoritarian legality to a more democratic legality. Democratic
legal systems differ from authoritarian ones in that the rules facilitate cooperative
behavior rather than mistrust. De Soto argues persuasively:
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We have spoken of good laws and bad laws, a good law being one that guarantees
and facilitates the efficiency of the economic and social activities it regulates and
a bad law, one that disrupts or totally prevents it. . . .
[Good laws] must facilitate the specialization and interdependence of individuals
and resources. . . .
However, this specialization of individuals and resources cannot take place if
individuals are isolated and do not trust one another. . . . There can be no denying
that the law and the institutions safeguarding it are the principal source of this
trust.151
Understanding the process by which “good” laws emerge requires that we
examine the puzzle of institutional emergence. Institutions are not static. Authoritarian
regimes become democratic more readily than bad laws become good because there are
significantly less institutions to change. Only a handful of key players need to agree to
make the initial transition to democracy whereas legal institutions are so diffused
throughout society that the masses as well as elites must be engaged for law to be
transformed. Democratic consolidation, unlike democratic transition, requires an
attitudinal shift in the citizenry. The answer to the puzzle of institutional emergence lies
in examining why some institutions fail and why others succeed. The next section takes
up this issue by looking at why constitutionalism failed to change the status quo in Latin
America but not in the United States.
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IV. A Tale of Two Constitutions
‘In Peru, we have very good laws, but one is missing: a law that says that all the
other laws should be complied with.’ Nicolás de Piérola, President of Peru, 18951899152
Although constitutions are designed to regulate government, nations with similar
constitutions have governments that can and do behave differently. The nations of Latin
America adopted constitutions that formally looked like that of the United States,153 but
Latin America’s constitutions facilitated authoritarianism whereas the constitution of the
United States helped consolidate democracy. These different outcomes rest on how
constitutions were socially constructed. Constitutional politics in the United States is
democratic because it rests on citizen mobilization and involvement in constitutional
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change.154 Governments and elites pay attention to the rules of the game because they
understand that the citizens might mobilize on behalf of the rules.155 As a consequence,
the constitution was able to serve as the backdrop to a series of negotiations and
compromises that allowed the constitution to change slowly over time. Constitutional
politics in Latin America, on the other hand, led to a divorce between the citizenry and
formal constitutional rules of the game.156 The decision to centralize power and make
rules malleable to promote development enhanced elite power but at the expense of
citizen allegiance to the fundamental rules of the game. There was little reason for
citizens to mobilize on behalf of rules that could be readily changed by those in power.157
As a consequence, peaceful negotiations and compromises proved difficult and the
solution to many political disputes became the golpe de estado.
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The issue is how Latin America might start on the road towards a more
democratic constitutional politics by making the difficult transition from a government of
men to one of laws. One appealing answer to this issue is that what is defective are the
institutions that Latin America adopted and that the solution lies in adopting better
ground rules. A number of scholars have become busy in the wake of the third wave of
democratization writing and arguing about how to better design the bits and pieces of
democracy in Latin America—the executive,158 the judiciary,159 the legislature,160 and
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state and local government161—to provide the sort of pay-off to the citizenry that is
needed if democracy is to endure.
The problem with engineering solutions is that if the history of constitutional
politics in Latin America teaches us anything, it is that tinkering with constitutions alone
cannot construct democracy. The history of the region is littered by reforms that failed
because they did not transform local power structures.162 As Professor Thome notes, how
reforms play out depends on a “hard-to-unravel socio-legal tapestry.”163 The operation of
rules is mediated by the environment in which they are placed and which those rules also
help create. Liberal constitutions in the nineteenth century were not simply trumped by a
hostile environment but paradoxically played an important role in creating the very
environment that set Latin America on a different path than the United States. 164
Another appealing but very different answer to the problem of why Latin
American constitutional politics took a different path than the United States contends that
engineering solutions are unimportant since the key to understanding the efficacy of
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constitutional rules lies in the attitudes of the citizens towards those rules. Professor
Putnam argues that legal reforms are not the key to making democracy work since such
reforms cannot transform deeply entrenched attitudes.165 Rather it is the habits and mores
of the citizenry that explain why some parts of the world are authoritarian and others
democratic. No doubt a civic culture is important in sustaining democracy much as the
lack of such a culture facilitates authoritarianism.166 The problem with contending that
the nature of civil society is the sole determinant of the efficacy of legal reform167 is the
making of new constitutions—as well as the amending and maintenance of
constitutions—sometimes succeeds in creating the societal attitudes needed for
constitutions to become entrenched.168
This Article argues that to understand how constitutions may become entrenched,
we need to steer a path between the Scylla that better laws can transform society and the
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Charybdis that societal attitudes determine the success or failure of legal reforms. The
new constitutionalism in Latin America—the reforms currently being undertaken to
effectuate democracy—will suffer the same fate as the old—the liberal constitutions
adopted in the nineteenth century—unlesswe understand how the transition from a
government of men to one of laws may occur.169 To understand how Latin America
might begin on the path of a more democratic constitutional politics, we need to unravel
the legal and social tapestry of Latin American constitutionalism. First, we need to
understand why it has proven so difficult to entrench constitutions in Latin America. Part
IV(A) infra argues that though the conditions that led to the adoption of malleable
constitutions no longer exist, those rules created an environment which makes reform
difficult. The diffuse interest that citizens have in entrenching constitutions is trumped
by the more intense preferences that political and social elites have in perpetuating the
status quo. Simply because constitutional entrenchment is desirable does not mean that
reform will occur. Institutional arrangements may be normatively irrational but socially
rational. Second, we need to understand the processes by which the logicof Latin
American constitutionalism might be transformed. Part IV(B) infra explores how social
movements sometimes succeed in transforming the logic of constitutional politics so that
governments and elites pay greater attention towards rules. Social movements that
succeed in entrenching constitutional rules do so by deepening the diffuse interest that
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citizens have in protecting their rights into more deeply held preferences. Revolutions
that succeed do so by creating broad and deep support for rights.
A. The logic of constitutionalism without constitutional entrenchment
There is a long and rich scholarly tradition of ignoring constitutions in explaining
Latin American politics.170 Given the obvious gap between written constitutions
proclaiming limited government and individual rights and the reality of regimes that
respect few limits on power, it is frequently and mistakenly argued that constitutions are
meaningless abstractions in Latin America.171 Although formal constitutions do not
provide an accurate map of political power, this does not mean that political behavior
does not respond to norms. Professor O’Donnell argues persuasively that the reason
formal rules failed to limit political power is that they were “trumped” by informal ones
and that the proper inquiry, therefore, is to determine what the informal rules of political
behavior are.172
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To understand how these informal rules arose and why they have persisted, we
need to understand the notion of path dependency. In Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, Professor Roe explains path dependency with a metaphor.173 Imagine that
when a path was originally laid out, the road builders feared dangerous animals that lived
in the forest. The path meandered to avoid this danger. Over time, towns and cities grew
up along this path. Although over time it became clear that a straight path would lower
transportation costs, it is very difficult politically to create a consensus on changing the
path because those who live along the crooked path would suffer from the loss of traffic
that would result from any improvements. That is to say, institutions that were rational
when initially designed persist even though they are no longer desirable because the
political calculus shifted in a manner that favors the suboptimal status quo. Path
dependency, in short, explains why institutions that do not work well are very difficult to
change because they enjoy considerable political support.
Latin America’s constitutions bear important birth marks that have proven very
resilient. The dangerous animals that Latin America’s constitution writers feared were
the lower classes. Inequality made the masses potentially dangerous to the elites. Thus,
constitutions were drafted that allocated significant power to the executive to deal with
emergencies with the hope that development would one day make republican governance
possible.174 Latin America’s constitutions are, therefore, strongly presidentialist.
Legislation typicallyoriginates with the president either through his formal decree power
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or his control over the legislature.175 Virtually all the constitutions of the region
authorize elected leaders to declare states of siege in an emergency.176 These provisions
have provided the “juridical foundation of dictatorship and tyranny.”177 In short, as
Professor O’Donnell argues, Latin America does not have constitutional or dualist
democracy but a form of monist democracy which he calls delegative democracy because
it rests “on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to
govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations
and by a constitutionally limited term of office.”178
The decision in the nineteenth century by the framers of Latin America’s
constitutions to allocate excessive power to presidents had two very important but
unintended consequences. First, constitutionalism in Latin America shortened the time
lines of political actors making it difficult to reach the sort of accommodations needed to
solve pressing social problems. Given the malleability of rules, presidents quite naturally
fear coups and unrest. As a consequence, presidents frequently choose policies that
strengthen their hold on power by placing cronies in political power over policies that
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might have a pay-off in the future.179 The excessive power given presidents also means
that they fear the election of opponents with markedly different views and are quite
willing to bend rules to prevent such a result from occurring.180 Democracy in Latin
America combines the worst elements of authoritarianism and democracy as presidents
have nearly the powers of a despot but must use that power to shore up their political
support at the expense of policies that have a long term pay-off. Building the
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infrastructure needed to create a system of checks and balances, however, requires a
long-term perspective that can only be provided by effectuating reasonably firm
constitutional principles.
Second, although constitutions are designed to be difficult to change, the reality is
that strong leaders have been able to change them easily.181 The constitutions of the
region have been, behaviorally speaking, flexible rather than rigid. Rigid constitutions
preserve the fundamental rules of the games from the workings of ordinary politics
whereas flexible constitutions are no more difficult to change than is ordinary
legislation.182 Flexible constitutions facilitate minority power over majorities by
allowing those in power to rewrite the fundamental rules of the game in their favor.183
Rules that are readily changed at the behest of those in power facilitate elite power but
come at a high cost which is that elites and the masses lose trust in the rules under which
they are formally governed. One consequence of this lack of trust in constitutional rules
is that political accommodations in the region typically come in the form of pacts or deals
that bind the individuals who made them184 but pacts, unlike constitutions, are not intergenerational deals. Pacts work if the parties who made them trust each other but
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constitutions require something more which is a trust in the “’power of words engrossed
on parchment to keep government in order.’”185
In short, the drafters of Latin America’s constitutions sought to centralize power
in the hands of the president in an attempt to steer a path between tyranny and anarchy.
The paradox of Latin American constitutionalism is that it perpetuated the very ills that it
sought to avoid. Elite mistrust of the massesand the desire to foment development led to
the over-centralization of power in the hope that authoritarianism today would lead to
republican government tomorrow. As a consequence constitutions lack the social
moorings they need if they are to serve as an effective counterweight to political power.
The construction of the institutional infrastructure needed to cabin political power and
effectuate republican government, however, is impossible without constitutional rules
that are beyond the reach of ordinary politics. One of the lessons of Latin American
constitutionalism is that long-term political stability is impossible without entrenched
constitutional rules.186 Constitutionalism without constitutional entrenchment leads to
instability and crises.187
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B. The social construction of constitutional entrenchment
Polities do manage to entrench constitutional rules. The leading account of how
this occurs stresses the importance of elite pacts.188 Professors North and Weingast note
that any bargain may fall apart because the incentives for complying with the deal are
different than those in making the deal in the first place.189 Constitutions work when they
are “self-enforcing” so that the “major parties to the bargain” have an “incentive to abide
by the bargain after it is made.”190 Constitutional bargains stick when elites realize that it
is in their self-interest to cede power to constitutions and to the laws more generally by
making a “credible commitment” that they will abide by those rules.191 When other
actors trust that these commitments will be kept, then the co-operation needed to ensure
political stability may occur.
The problem with the elite-centered account of constitutional entrenchment is that
it ignores the role of the people in making the commitments contained in constitutions
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credible.192 A core argument of this Article is that constitutions cannot be entrenched
without citizen attachment to constitutional rules. As Professor Whittington notes:
[C]onstitutions attempt to regulate the government itself and cannot rely on any
external enforcement mechanisms. . . . [T]he primary sanction available for a
constitutional violation is simply publicity of the violation, which centrally
depends for its effectiveness on the continued general commitment to the
constitutional provisions that are being violated.193
Elite pacts may bring stability for the generation that made the deal in question but the
constitutional enterprise aims at creating a community “that can survive the corrupting
influences of time and fortune.”194 In short, credible constitutional commitments must
not only be politically constructed by the elite bargaining that typically underpins the
formal making of constitutions195 but must be also socially constructed by, as de
Tocqueville noted, by the subterranean process in which the “T]he spirit of the law . . .
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gradually penetrates . . . into the bosom of society . . . so that at last the whole people
contract the habits and tastes of the judicial magistrate.”196
The differing constitutional fates of Argentina and the United States demonstrate
that a constitution that is simply politically constructed by an elite pact cannot stand the
test of time whereas one that is socially constructed may indeed endure. Argentina
experienced a period of sharp political conflict in the aftermath of independence in
1810197 that ended when a dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas, obtained sufficient power to
impose order. He rejected the necessity of a constitution198 and relied on a police force
and the personal allegiance of his followers, who benefited from his governance, to
maintain power from 1829 until 1852.199 Rosas was overthrown by forces that sought to
impose a constitutional order that would provide the basis for economic growth in
Argentina.200 Argentina’s economic growth had been stymied by its unstable institutional
environment. Argentina had land in abundance but could not attract either the

196

De Tocqueville, supra note __.
The constitutional struggle that led to civil war in the aftermath of
independence was motivated principally by the differing economic interests of political
actors located in different regions of Argentina. TULIO HALPERÍN DONGHI, POLITICS,
ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY IN ARGENTINA IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (Richard
Southern trans., 1975) and MIRON BURGIN, THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ARGENTINE
FEDERALISM, 1820-1852 (1946).
198
Letter from Juan Manual de Rosas to Don Juan Facundo Quiroga (Dec. 20,
1834), supra note __.
199
JOHN LYNCH, ARGENTINE DICTATOR: JUAN MANUAL DE ROSAS 1829-1852
(1981). Rosas was an able and brutal dictator who, rather oddly, called himself the
“Restorer of the Laws.” Rosas believed that he was restoring an older Hispanic order that
had been rent by liberal ideals. He had no patience for laws in any formal sense,
however, and personally reviewed the sentences handed down by his courts to determine
which of his enemies should be put to death and which ones exiled. Id.
200
JEREMY ADELMAN, REPUBLIC OF CAPITAL: BUENOS AIRES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ATLANTIC World (1999) and Lynch, supra note __.
197

60

immigrants or the capital it needed to make the land productive when it was rent by civil
war or governed by a dictator who used force to govern.
Professor Miller argues persuasively that the decision to adopt a constitution in
1853 modeled after that of the United States led to political stability and provided the
institutional underpinnings for Argentina’s phenomenal growth in the late nineteenth
century.201 Most scholars, as Professor Miller notes, ignore the importance of the 1853
constitution because it failed to implement political democracy or indeed many of the
provisions of the constitutional text.202 Political rights remained uncertain since elections
were rigged and there were numerous rebellions. Professor Miller concludes that
Argentine constitutionalism was an
enormous success, however, in terms of what its designers wished to
accomplish—to encourage immigration and to stimulate economic growth. It was
also successful in establishing a system of mutual security under which the
political opposition, even in the absence of democratic elections, knew that it
would suffer only limited oppression, and where the party in power knew that
even if the opposition came to power, it would not do them serious harm.203
The 1853 constitution was, however, only an elite bargain as evidenced by the
failure to implement many of its provisions and by the lack of public deliberation that
accompanied its adoption.204 The sort of electoral fraud regularly practiced under the
1853 constitution could not occur under a constitution with deeper social moorings. The
real source of power during this period was the acuerdo or informal agreements between
political elites.205 This result was foreseen by the framers of the 1853 constitution who
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believed that civil society was a threat to order and that the “republican state should be
autonomous from civil society as a whole.”206
The political order created in 1853 broke down in the early twentieth century
under the weight of massive immigration and the inability of the Argentine state to find a
means to incorporate these new citizens into the political system.207 The constitutional
system created in 1853 was unable to change to deal with these social transformations
because the formal rules of the game lacked social moorings. The lack of support for the
1853 constitution is evidenced by the course of Argentina’s twentieth century political
history. When the military overthrew a popularly elected president in 1930, the citizens
did not rise up to protest the overthrow of the constitution. For the next fifty years,
Argentine politics oscillated between dictatorship and democracy. Without a separation
between ordinary and constitutional politics, the changes needed to deal with the social
transformations caused by immigration were not possible within the framework of the
1853 constitution.
The failure of Argentina’s 1853 settlement illustrates that elite pacts cannot
withstand the test of time thatis the acid test of successful constitutions. Argentina’s
constitution lacked social moorings because it aimed only at ending political disputes
between elites but failed to sweep away the authoritarian social and political order that
Argentina inherited from Spain. The American revolution, on the other hand, provides an
example of how a constitution can obtain deep social moorings by sweeping awayan
authoritarian legal and social order. Colonial North American did not differ as much
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from Latin America as is commonly believed.208 The British colonies were ruled by a
monarchy and society was hierarchical and clientelistic. Patronage was the glue that held
this society together because it provided a link between inferiors and superiors in which
resources were exchanged for loyalty.209 Law “reinforced dependencies of all sorts”
since more than “half of the people in most of the settlements were legally unfree in some
way—dependent on fathers or husbands, masters or landlords.”210
The disintegration of this inegalitarian, monarchical society was necessary for
republicanism to succeed. Professor Wood argues that the American revolution was the
most radical in history if measured by the “degree of social transformation that
occurred.”211 Wood concludes:
The revolutionaries aimed at nothing less than a reconstitution of American
society. They hoped to destroy the bonds holding together the older monarchical
society—kinship, patriarchy, and patronage—and to put in their place new social
bonds of love, respect, and consent. They sought to construct a society and
government based on virtue and disinterested public leadership and to set in
motion a moral movement that would eventually be felt around the globe.212
The key to the long-term success of the American revolution was that it facilitated
a peculiar form of politics by entrenching the constitution. Subsequent constitutional
change was possible only if supported by a large majority of the citizenry. Such changes
helped deepen citizen attachment to the constitution since they are directly involved in
constitutional transformations. The social movements generated by constitutional
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struggles play a “jurisgenerative role,” as Professor Siegal notes, by ultimately deepening
citizen attachment to the constitution.213 Higher lawmaking forces citizens to take part in
constitutional change which plays an important role in connecting civil society to the
state.214 Even the losers stay in the constitutional game because they can turn to
“constitutional and higher-law arguments to articulate their deeply felt demands.”215
Constitutional politics within a framework of a constitution that has deep social
moorings may not only deepen citizen attachment to the constitution but can also help
solve the problem of the non-enforcement of constitutional provisions. Constitutional
rules are sometimes trumped by social norms in the United States no less thanin Latin
America. The Reconstruction amendments that promised political equality to the freed
slave were ignored for a century because of the intense desire of Southern whites to
maintain an egalitarian social structure.216 Ordinary politics in a democracy cannot solve
collective action problems where there is broad but diffuse support for a certain outcome
and narrow but intense support for a very different outcome.217 Constitutional politics
that rest on social movements, on the other hand, can operationalize non-enforced
constitutional norms by transforming societal attitudes. The best example of how this
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may occur lies in the complex relationship between Brown v. Board of Education218 and
the civil rights revolution. Professor Klarman argues that Brown did little directly to
desegregate Southern schools directly as little changed in the South in the decade
following the decision.219 Brown facilitated the realization of the promise of equality
embedded in the Reconstruction amendments by “invigorating a civil rights
movement.”220 The civil rights movement, in turn, led to massive and violent resistance
in the South thattransformed the diffuse support in the North for the political goal of
equality to a more intense support. This change in intensity of preference in the North
was critical to the enactment of the important legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964.221 Brown is, as Professor Powe notes,222 ultimately a majoritarian decision but it is
a peculiar one in that it helped fashion the very majority that provided the decision with
the support it needed to be effectuated.
The reason that Latin America has not undergone similar constitutional
transformations is clearly not for want of social movements but rather because the
conditions that made possible the separation of constitutional from ordinary politics in the
United States did not occur in Latin America until the recent wave of democratization
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that began in the 1980s.223 The profound social inequality that marks the region led elites
to opt for a peculiar form of liberalism that excluded the masses from power.
Constitutions became flexible, behaviorally speaking, to facilitate elite power but the cost
was that they lacked broad citizen support. As a consequence the social movements that
arose were typically revolutionary since there was no possibility of transforming the
system without an armed struggle.224 These social movements were similar to social
movements in the United States, however, inasmuch as they sought to transform the
obvious diffuse base of support for change into more intense preferences that were
needed if a revolution were to succeed. The twentieth century witnessed a long struggle
between a revolutionary left and conservative elements made up of elites and the military
supported by the United States.
The end of the Cold War transformed Latin American politics as conservative
elements gave up their iron grip on power and the left moved from revolution to political
and grass roots organization. The end of revolutionary struggle also led the United States
to abandon its support for dictatorship in the region. The combination of poverty and
inequality has led to the triumph of the political left throughout most of the region.225
The social construction of constitutionalism in the region is now possible as the political
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system has become responsive to societal pressure.226 Grass roots movements in the
region have led to a transformation of the public sphere as new linkages are being created
between informal democratic practices and the institutions of governance.227
In short, it is not a law requiring that all the other laws be respected that Latin
America needs for constitutionalism to work, even if that has been the hope of Latin
American reformers from Simon Bolívar to President Hugo Chávez. What Latin
America needs to make the transition from authoritarian to democratic legality is not
more “good” laws imposed from above but social movements from below that press
governments to respect rights. Social movements form to demand change when
governments are not responsive to citizen demands.228 Individual rights lie at the basis of
social movements229 because they provide a “trump” card against government action.
Social movements seek to have rights embedded in constitutions and other laws because
the law dramatically lowers the cost of having rights enforced. Rights that require the
mobilization of social movements to effectuate are difficult to exercise whereas rights
that are protected by the government can be realized without the necessity of collective
action. Successful social movements close the gap between the rhetoric of a legal order
and the behavior of political actors. When a desire to have the fundamental rules of the
game respected permeates society, rulers have an incentive to respect those rules. The
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fidelity to rules which democratic consolidation requires can be created in the very
process of effectuating those rights.
V. Conclusion
Mirrors symbolize reality, the sun, the earth and its four corners, its surface, its
depths, and all of its peoples. . . . Is not the mirror both a reflection of reality and a
projection of the imagination?230
Comparative constitutionalism clearly broadens and deepens our understanding of
constitutional law.231 It also forces us to think about the linkages between constitutional
law and the larger social world within which it is embedded. Professor Scheppele writes
“The urgent issue in constitutional studies typically is to know whether the experiences of
some constitutional settings are helpful for understanding others.”232 The key to making
a claim that the experience of one nation might help another is not to focus on specific
laws but rather to understand the “logics of particular contexts as a way of illuminating
complex interrelationships among political, legal, historical, social, economic, and
cultural elements.”233 Examining constitutionalism through the looking glass of Latin
America allows us to unravel the linkages between constitutions and society.
This Article explores a deceptively simple question: why did constitutionalism in
Latin America take a different path than in the United States? Constitutions were
adopted throughout the New World in the wake of independence movements in the late
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to effectuate republican government. Yet
constitutionalism in Latin America led to dictatorship whereas constitutionalism in the
United States led to republican government. The conventional answer to this issue is that
the constitution was entrenched in the United States because law is independent from
politics,234 whereas constitutions are not entrenched in Latin America because politics
trump constitutions.235 The problem with this view is that it conflates the end of a long
historical process with the process itself. Presidents in the United States today must
respect court orders. There is little doubt, however, thathas not always been the case.
Justice Marshall strained to avoid a dispute with President Jefferson to hand over the
commission sought by William Marbury because the Supreme Court of 1802 lacked the
authority to order a President to comply with its orders.236 Presidents in Latin America,
on the other hand, currently enjoy a rich repertoire of mechanisms they can use to
circumvent constitutional restraints.237 The issue facing new democracies in Latin
America and throughout the world is not whether constitutions should be judicially
enforced,238 but how do constitutions become entrenched against political inroads.
The answer to that question requires that we peer through the looking glass of
constitutional law to determine how constitutional norms are socially constructed so that
elected leaders must respect them. The devolution in power from political leaders to
rules that is the key to consolidating democracy occurs when there is trust that the
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constitution will maintain order. The constitution became entrenched in the United States
not because law enjoys independence from politics but because constitutional politics is
played under a different set of rules than is ordinary politics.239 The difficulty in
amending the constitution does not flow from the provisions of Article V as the
constitution has undergone important transformations outside the formal mechanisms of
the constitution. The constitution is difficult to transform because constitutional change
requires debate and citizen mobilization.
Constitutions in Latin America are also constantly being changed by a variety of
mechanisms outside the formal amendment provisions embedded in the region’s
constitutions.240 The difference, though, is that these changes do not rest on citizen
mobilization but are a result of elites seeking to perpetuate their power.241
Constitutionalism in Latin America facilitated dictatorship not because constitutions are
meaningless abstractions but because constitutional politics were played under a very
different set of understandings than in the United States. Elites, not citizens, dictated
constitutional change and as a consequence constitutions became as easy to change as
ordinary legislation.242 The differing founding experiences and subsequent constitutional
fates of Latin America and the United States demonstrate that a constitution that is
politically constructed by an elite pact without the support of the citizens cannot stand the
test of time whereas one that is constructed with adequate social moorings may do so.
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The answer to the issue that underpins this Article then is that how constitutions are
socially constructed determines political outcomes such as dictatorship or democracy.243
Louis Hartz concluded his magisterial The Liberal Tradition in America by
arguing that American democracy had little to teach the world because it was
exceptional.244 Hartz was partially right. The United States has little to teach the world
when democracy is viewed as an export from the developed world to the underdeveloped
world. Law reform in the developing world has rested for too long on exports from the
developed world. These borrowed laws have never quite worked in their new
environment as they did in the old. The paradigm that provides the intellectual
underpinnings for the project of borrowing needs to be reversed if we are to understand
constitutionalism. Legal theory in the United States will be enriched if the attitude that
the South must learn from the North is replaced by one that takes seriously the problems
faced by the South in entrenching constitutions.245 The comparative constitutional law
enterprise, in short, has much to teach the United States about what makes democracy
work.
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